In this paper, we consider whether long-term inflation expectations have become better anchored in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. We do so using survey-based measures as well as financialmarket-based measures of long-term inflation expectations, where we construct the market-based measures from daily prices on nominal and inflation-linked bonds. This paper is the first to examine the evidence from Brazil and Mexico, making use of the fact that markets for longterm government debt have become better developed over the past decade. We find that inflation expectations have become much better anchored over the past decade in all three countries, as a testament to the improved credibility of the central banks in these countries when it comes to keeping inflation low. That said, one-year inflation compensation in the far future displays some sensitivity to at least one macroeconomic data release per country. However, the impact of these releases is small and it does not appear that investors systematically alter their expectations for inflation as a result of surprises in monetary policy, consumer prices, or real activity variables. Finally, long-run inflation expectations in Brazil appear to have been less well anchored than in Chile and Mexico. 
Introduction
Nearly 30 countries have adopted inflation-targeting frameworks, driven by a conviction that defining an explicit inflation target and communicating how the central bank will strive to meet that goal is the best monetary policy strategy for maintaining inflation at a relatively low and stable level without sacrificing long-term growth. to which inflation expectations are well anchored using survey and financial market data. Because of data limitations, however, most of the latter work has focused on the experience of industrialized countries. In this study, we overcome some of these data problems for developing countries and explore whether, and to what degree, long-term inflation expectations are well anchored in three emerging market economies: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
The behavior of long-term inflation expectations provides insight into the success of inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy. Emerging market economies (EMEs) tend to be subject to particularly large and frequent disturbances to the economy (Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella, 2004), and these disturbances at times can drive inflation away from the target. Furthermore, monetary policy influences inflation with a considerable lag and there is uncertainty about the transmission process itself. These circumstances will influence inflation expectations over the short-and mediumterm. But if the central bank is viewed as being credibly committed to bringing inflation back to the inflation goal, shocks that affect inflation should be viewed as transitory and should therefore not influence long-term inflation expectations.
Although most studies compare inflation-targeting countries with non-inflation-targeting countries, inflation-targeting countries often practice very different policies. Hence, we believe it is informative to consider within-group differences by comparing the experiences of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. These three Latin American countries adopted inflation-targeting frameworks over a decade ago and are similar in at least two other respects: They are at comparable stages of development and have a historical record of monetary and fiscal mismanagement and high inflation.
However, there are also differences among the three with respect to institutional settings and in how their central banks explain to the public how they will strive to achieve the inflation goal.
Chile, for example, had already achieved considerable success in macroeconomic stabilization in 1 According to Hammond (2012) , 27 countries are considered to have inflation-targeting frameworks: Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Many observers would also add the euro area to this list. 1 the 1980s. The Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) is not legally independent, which has at times raised questions about its ability to fulfill its inflation-targeting mandate without political interference.
Several years after the Bank of Mexico (BOM) adopted its inflation-targeting framework, it had continued to formally target a money aggregate and, unlike most other inflation-targeting central banks, did not publish its inflation forecasts, see Batini and Laxton (2006) . 2 Our approach is a blend of a formal and informal analysis. In our formal analysis, we follow the approach that was first used by Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder, and Swanson (2007a) by examining evidence from financial-market-derived measures of long-term inflation expectations. Long-horizon financial-market-based expectations of future inflation with a sufficiently long history have been unavailable to date for Brazil and Mexico (and somewhat less so for Chile) as a result of insufficient historical data on local-currency-denominated sovereign bond prices. Therefore, we first collected a comprehensive set of historical prices on nominal and inflation-linked sovereign bonds for Brazil and Mexico-the Chilean data were provided to us by RiskAmerica-and used these prices to construct daily far-forward inflation compensation estimates for each country, as we detail below. We exploit the fact here that over the past decade, bond markets in Brazil and Mexico have made remarkable strides in terms of depth and liquidity, which allows us to construct these types of high-frequency market-based measures.
Inflation compensation provides a reading on investors' expectations for inflation plus the premium that investors demand for the risk that inflation may exceed its expected level. 3 Far-forward inflation compensation covers a period that is several years in the future, beyond the period over which transitory shocks typically influence macroeconomic activity. In our informal analysis, we compare far-forward inflation compensation with long-term inflation expectations derived from Consensus Economics' survey data. We can compare the two measures to assess whether they convey differences in the degree to which countries' inflation-targeting frameworks are successful in shaping agents' expectations about future inflation.
Similar to Gürkaynak et al. (2007a) and Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2010a), among others, we then assess whether our market-based measures of far-forward inflation compensation respond significantly to domestic news surprises in monetary policy decisions, consumer prices, and real activity data releases. We also consider whether inflation compensation in these countries is sensitive to news from the United States and China. We consider China because of its increasing importance over the past decade as an export destination for Brazil and Chile.
2 Between the late 1990s and 2008, the BOM formally followed an operating procedure that is known as 'el corto' and which is similar to targeting non-borrowed reserves, see below, as well as Ramos-Francia and Torres-García (2005) .
3 Hördahl (2009) notes besides reflecting these two factors, inflation compensation also reflects liquidity premia and "technical" market factors. While we do not explicitly take these items into account in our baseline regression analysis in Section 4.1, we do consider controlling for them in a sensitivity analysis to our baseline results, see Appendix A.
Gürkaynak et al. (2010a) found that long-term inflation expectations were better anchored in
Sweden, an inflation-targeting country, than in the United States, which at the time did not have an explicit inflation target in place. Far-forward inflation compensation for Sweden did not react significantly to news suprises during a period from 1996 to 2005, while U.S. forward inflation compensation did react significantly to surprises during a very similar period (1998 to 2005). These authors also found that long-term inflation expectations in the United Kingdom became well anchored after the Bank of England gained legal independence in the late 1990s. Gürkaynak et al. These studies have nearly all focused on the experience of industrialized economies, as marketbased measures of long-term inflation expectations have been unavailable to date for many emerging market economies. That long-term bond markets in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have developed rapidly over the past decade now allows us to construct our financial-market-based inflation compensation measures. Although market liquidity problems for some long-term bonds in these countries will still certainly pose an issue, we believe it is well worth taking a closer look at what the results from the event-study analysis imply.
Overall, we find that inflation expectations have become much better anchored over the past decade in all three countries, which is a major achievement, considering these countries' highinflation past. That said, survey-based and financial-market-based readings on the long-term inflation outlook have been consistently above the target in Brazil and Mexico, but more so in Brazil.
Moreover, although we do not find evidence that market participants systematically revise their views about long-term inflation in response to domestic macroeconomic and monetary policy news, one-year inflation compensation in the far future displays some sensitivity to at least one macroeconomic data release in each country. New information appears to prompt market participants to revise either their expectations on inflation directly or their assessment of risks to the inflation outlook more generally. Revisions are relatively small, however. Far-forward inflation compensation for Mexico is sensitive to U.S. nonfarm payrolls data, likely reflecting both the tight linkages between the two economies and the fact that important Mexican macroeconomic data are released with a considerable delay. Far-forward inflation compensation in Brazil, but not in Chile, exhibits some sensitivity to data releases from China. Finally, evidence from both financial markets and survey data suggest that long-run inflation expectations have been less well anchored in Brazil than 3 in Chile and Mexico. As in all empirical studies that look at the response of financial market variables to economic news, the explanatory power of our regressions is quite low. Although in our case this result is consistent with the null hypothesis that inflation expectations have become better anchored, the volatility in some of our inflation compensation measures indicates that it may simply be that other types of news that we are not able to capture in our regressions have been important drivers of long-term inflation expectations and inflation risk premia for these countries.
2 Inflation Targeting in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
Inflation Targeting in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico adopted inflation-targeting frameworks after having previously experimented with alternative monetary policy strategies. Brazil adopted an inflation-targeting framework in 1999 after abandoning a fixed exchange rate policy in the midst of a currency crisis. In Chile, the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) had begun to set annual inflation targets in the early 1990s. However, a "full-fledged" inflation-targeting framework was put into place in 1999, when, upon floating the Chilean peso in September of that year, the CBC announced that it would implement an inflation-targeting framework and that the inflation target range would be 2 to 4 percent beginning in 2001, see Valdés (2007) . In 2007, the inflation target was set at 3 percent within a 2 to 4 percent tolerance range.
In Mexico, after abandoning its fixed exchange rate policy in December 1994, the BOM, in search of a new nominal anchor, adopted a money target. However, the BOM found that money demand was too unstable for money targets to be an effective means of controlling inflation. By Reflecting a growing consensus that central banks need to be free from political pressures to pursue short-term objectives, the central banks of Chile and Mexico had been granted legal autonomy with price stability as their primary mandate, Chile in 1990 and Mexico in 1994. In Brazil, in the absence of formal legal independence for the CBB, the law that laid out the basic features of the inflation-targeting framework delegated the central bank with the responsibility of pursuing the target, which in effect meant that the CBB had sole control over targeting the Selic rate as its key monetary policy instrument. Steps were also taken in all three countries to 4 strengthen public finances. Authorities enacted reforms in the financial sector and other areas to reduce vulnerabilities to financial turmoil. Fraga, who had presided over the introduction of the inflation-targeting framework, relates that "... [d] uring the initial phase, a gradual and declining path for inflation was defined with the aim of bringing inflation to the desired level. At that moment, we imagined that such level would be, in a first step, something close to 3 to 4 percent (inspired by the Chilean experience) and that, with time, we would go to a rate close to the world average" (Fraga, 2009, the translation is ours).
After the Lula government took office, the inflation target was set at 4 ." (Grinbaum, 2012, the translation is ours.). As we detail below, there is some evidence that uncertainty about the longer-term inflation goal has been feeding into survey and financial market-based readings on the longer-term inflation outlook for Brazil. 5 For Brazil, the core inflation measure shown excludes food and fuel for vehicles and home use. Together, these items have about a 16 percent weight in the headline index. For Chile, core inflation is the CPIX, which excludes fuels, fresh fruits, and vegetables. These items have a weight of about 9 percent in the headline CPI. Core inflation for Mexico excludes fruits and vegetables, meat and eggs, and energy and other government-regulated prices. These items have a 25 percent weight in the headline CPI. 
Financial Market-Based Inflation Expectations
One shortcoming of using survey-based measures of long-term inflation expectations is that these measures are usually available only at relatively low frequencies; monthly, quarterly, or even semiannually. It is therefore difficult to truly gauge whether a central bank's inflation targeting framework is successful in shaping agents' expectations about future inflation.
Luckily, we can now derive much higher-frequency gauges of inflation expectations for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico from financial market data. Note that as recently as one decade ago this was still virtually impossible because bond markets were not yet well-developed in these countries. Since then, however, each country has made important strides forward, and depth and liquidity in these markets has risen substantially. As a result, we can now construct high-frequency measures of (farforward) inflation compensation using data on nominal and real bond prices, all typically available at a daily frequency. Market participants and policy makers alike heavily track these financial market-based measures for major industrialized countries to gauge the effect of macroeconomic news announcements and monetary policy decisions on market participants' perception of future inflation, for example using the event study analysis of the studies referenced in the introduction.
9 Dispersion measures reflect the degree of disagreement among forecasters and are considered to be a reasonable proxy for inflation uncertainty. Beechey, Johanssen, and Levin (2011) compare the dispersion of survey-based measures of long-term inflation expectations in the euro area with that for the U.S. and find that the dispersion was higher in the U.S. Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2010) find that the dispersion in short-and medium-term inflation expectations is lower in countries with inflation targeting than in countries without.
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Here we apply this same type of analysis specifically to our three EME countries.
One important caveat to using these measures, however, is that they do not necessarily offer a fully clean read on inflation expectations. As pointed out by Hördahl (2009), besides reflecting the level of expected inflation, inflation compensation also embeds inflation risk premia, liquidity premia, and technical factors. It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish these different factors without having to resort to strong identifying assumptions.
In this section, we first construct inflation compensation measures for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
In particular, we use term structure estimation techniques to construct full term structures of inflation compensation at various horizons. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to construct these measures in detail for Brazil and Mexico (and in a certain sense for Chile as well, although most of the work for Chile was done for us by RiskAmerica). We construct sufficientlylong historical time-series of market-based inflation compensation and then use these in our event study analysis in Section 4.
Estimating Inflation Compensation Measures
We estimate our financial-market-based inflation compensation measures as the spread between yields on nominal and inflation-indexed (real) sovereign bonds. The latter bonds have a principal value that is linked to inflation and therefore protect investors from inflation risk. While Brazil, Chile and Mexico all have had a reasonable number of inflation-linked bonds outstanding since at least the early 2000s, it is their nominal bond markets that have seen the most growth over the past decade. 10 The fact that these countries have been able to issue long-term nominal debt is a sign of improved investor confidence in the central banks' ability to keep inflation low.
The now-outstanding spectrum of both nominal and real sovereign bonds allows us to construct nominal and real zero-coupon curves from these bonds, respectively. The zero curve estimation method we apply is that of Nelson and Siegel (1987) which has increasingly become the workhorse method for estimating zero curves from bond prices. 11 A zero-coupon yield curve consists of the collection of interest rates earned on non-couponpaying bonds with increasing maturities. Because zero-coupon yields are not directly observable but are instead embedded in coupon-bearing bonds, we must resort to curve estimation techniques. Here we use the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. This model postulates that the curve of continuouslycompounded zero-coupon yields at any given time t can be well described by a smooth parametric 10 In contrast, some developed economies, for example Germany and Japan, while having extremely liquid nominal bond markets, still have much less developed inflation-linked bond markets, with only a small number of bonds outstanding at any given time.
11 For example, the Bank of International Settlements, (BIS, 2005) , reports that nine out of the thirteen (predominantly European) central banks that report their zero-coupon curve estimates to the BIS use either the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model or an extension of it, the Svensson (1994) model, to construct zero-coupon yield curves. 8 function which is determined by just four parameters;
where y t (τ ) is the model-implied τ -period zero-coupon yield and {β 1,t , β 2,t β 3,t , λ t } is the parameter vector. These parameters can be interpreted as the level parameter, β 1,t ; the slope parameter, β 2,t ; and the curvature parameter, β 3,t , judging from the effect that a change in each of these respective parameters has on the shape of the curve, see for example Diebold and Li (2006). The fourth parameter, λ t , is a shape parameter that influences the factor loadings associated with the slope and curvature parameters. We follow the approach of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007b, 2010b) to estimate nominal and real zero-coupon curves from observed bond prices. In particular,
we estimate the Nelson-Siegel parameters by minimizing the sum of squared approximate yield errors; bond price fitting errors weighted by the inverse of modified duration (MDur):
where P i,t (τ ) are the prices for the N t observable bonds on day t, either nominal or real bonds, and . We only include bonds in the optimization that have a remaining maturity between three months and 15 years. An immediate problem arising from this particular maturity window is that our estimated yield curves could show odd behavior for maturities between zero and three months.
Specifically, because by construction there are no data points on short-term rates, the short end of the curve could in theory go to either plus of minus infinity. To prevent this from happening, we impose that the Nelson-Siegel-implied instantaneous short rate, the sum of β 1,t and β ,2t , has to be equal to the overnight rate, or, if the overnight rate shows erratic behaviour, the central banks'
official target rate. 12
Once we have estimates of the nominal and real zero-coupon curves for each day in the sample for our three countries, we take the difference between the two curves to construct an estimate of the inflation compensation curve. Furthermore, with the estimated Nelson-Siegel parameters, we can construct zero yields for any desired maturity. We can also easily compute nominal and real forward rates, and therefore forward inflation compensation estimates. We thus compute 1-year forward rates ending in 1, 2,..., 7 years in the future for Brazil and Mexico and 1-year forward rates ending in 1, 2,..., 10 years for Chile. In this paper we only use the 1-year forward rate ending in 7 years for Brazil and Mexico and the 1-year forward rate ending in 10 years for Chile. 13
Bond Data Brazil and Mexico
We collected historical prices on nominal and inflation-linked bonds for Brazil and Mexico from several sources. Since our goal is to construct long-enough time series of far-forward inflation compensation, we combined data from different sources. For Brazil we obtained daily prices for all currently and previously outstanding bonds from Bloomberg and MorganMarkets. For Mexico we combined data from Bloomberg and Proveedor Integral de Precios (PiP). 14 As is standard practice, we apply the usual filters to the available bond data; we do not include any bonds that have option-like features or floating coupon payments, and we do not include any bills out of concern that the behavior of bills can be quite different from that of bonds. From the remaining bonds, on any given day we only include those bonds that have a remaining maturity between 3 months and 15 years. 15 The top two panels of Figure 5 show the number of bonds over time that were included in the estimations. 16 For both Brazil and Mexico, the number of outstanding bonds has increased throughout the sample, in particular for nominal bonds. The total number of bonds continues to remain relatively small, however, likely introducing some degree of noise in our curve estimates. To shed some light on this issue, Figure 6 shows the average absolute bond price fitting errors for bonds with maturities between two and ten years. This metric is used in for example Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010b) to assess the fit of zero-coupon curve models.
On average, we fit bond prices with an error of about 25 basis points. This is higher than the yield fitting errors that Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010b) report for likely more-liquid U.S. Treasury
Inflation Protected Securities, but is certainly reasonable. 17 Note that the fitting errors for both 13 We leave analyzing the effects of macroeconomic news surprises on the full term structure of forward inflation compensation, such as is done in Beechey et al. (2011), for future research.
14 For Morgan Markets, see https://mm.jpmorgan.com/. For PiP, see https://www.precios.com.mx/. 15 Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007b) show that for estimating zero-coupon curves from U.S. Treasury bonds, one needs the Svensson (1994) model to accurately fit bond prices in the very longest end of the curve. However, the Svensson model requires estimating additional parameters compared with the Nelson and Siegel model. Therefore, due to the relatively small number of bond prices that we have available for any given day in our sample, we only consider maturities of up to fifteen years. In practice, only a few very long-maturity bonds have been issued in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico and imposing this restriction never removes more than one or two bonds.
16 Because the Nelson-Siegel model is a four-parameter model, we can only construct zero-coupon curves on days where at least four bond prices are available.
17 J.P. Morgan reports that liquidity in Mexican bond markets has improved over time, stating that the liquidity in 10-year Mexican bonds has "increased markedly", with bid-ask spreads having fallen and foreign holdings having Brazil and Mexico, in particular for inflation-index bonds in Mexico, spiked up at the height of the global financial crisis in late 2008, amidst large capital outflows from Latin American countries.
The bottom panels of Figure 5 show the longest-maturity bond used in the estimation. Panel C shows that Brazil did not issue its first long-maturity nominal bond until July 2006. We therefore start our data sample for Brazil in July 2006. Furthermore, even though Brazil has issued 10-year bonds at several times throughout our sample and has even issued a 15-year inflation-indexed bond in 2009, the longest maturity that is consistently outstanding throughout the sample is seven years.
In order to prevent having to extrapolate our zero-coupon curves for longer maturities, we therefore use our curves only up to maturities of seven years. We do the same for Mexico. While the longest maturity that is consistently available for Mexico is eight years, we chose the same 7-year maximum maturity out of convenience. While studies that have examined far-forward inflation compensation for developed economies typically look at 1-year forward rates ending in 10 years, our 1-year forward rates ending in 7 years are still far enough in the future such that unforeseen shocks to prices and the real economy should not drive inflation away from the target if inflation expectations are well anchored.
Chile
For Chile we use nominal and real zero-coupon curves that were graciously supplied to us by RiskAmerica. 18 RiskAmerica estimates zero-coupon curves from prices on Chilean nominal and inflation-linked sovereign bonds, in a comparable fashion as we do here for Brazil and Mexico. However, since that time, the maturity of the longest-outstanding bond has consistently been above ten years. We therefore use 1-year forward inflation compensation rates ending in 10 years, similar to Gürkaynak et al. (2007a) , as opposed to our forward inflation compensation measures for Brazil and Mexico, which end in seven years. Since Chilean forward rates are also based on fewer bonds than U.S. and U.K. forward rates, for example, they will tend to be more noisy. One interpretation of the spread between inflation compensation and the survey-based inflation expectations is that investors have not been confident that either the CBB or BOM will be able to achieve its inflation goal and have demanded extra compensation for the risk of higher inflation, and more so in Brazil than in Mexico. By taking the difference between our far-forward inflation compensation measures in Figure 7 and the long-term survey forecasts in the middle panels of We build upon the regression analyses used in the studies referenced above by regressing daily changes in forward nominal and real yields and, in particular, far-forward inflation compensation on the surprise component of news announcements on monetary policy, consumer prices, and the real economy. The premise here is that if inflation expectations are well anchored over the long term, far-forward inflation compensation should not react significantly to news surprises. If they do react significantly, then this is a indication that inflation expectations remain unanchored.
Far-Forward Inflation Compensation Estimates

Regression Approach
We estimate the parameters of the following linear regression specification:
where ∆y t,n is the daily change in either (forward) nominal or real rates, or far-forward inflation compensation ending in n years 21 and X t is the vector of news surprises. In our baseline regressions, Z t includes a dummy that equals one on the first business day of each calendar year, and zero elsewhere.
We are interested in which, if any, of the surprises included in the regression have a significant impact on inflation compensation, in which direction surprises move inflation compensation, and the size of these moves overall. Furthermore, to assess whether inflation expectations are overall well anchored or not, we perform a standard Wald test, testing the joint null hypothesis that all news surprise coefficients in the regression are equal to zero (i.e. we test the hypothesis that
with K the number of news surprises.).
We not only examine whether domestic news surprises move inflation compensation for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, but also whether news surprises from abroad have a significant impact, specifically news surprises from the U.S. and China. We do so by rerunning the regressions in (3), but 20 Gürkaynak et al. (2007a) also study inflation compensation in Chile and find that it does not react significantly to Chilean and U.S. news surprises. However, due to data limitations they only analyzed the relatively short sample from August 2002 to October 2005. Furthermore, their set of news surprises was small and, as the authors note, the survey measures used were likely to be somewhat stale. Here we use a much longer time series of inflation compensation, as well as a larger set of economic news surprises, as discussed in Section 4.2.
21 Recall that we use n = 7 for Brazil and Mexico, while we use n = 10 for Chile.
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now with an extended X t that includes either U.S. or Chinese news surprises (we examine these in separate regressions has had on the anchoring properties of inflation expectations in the U.S., U.K., and the euro area.
They found that inflation expectations may have become less well anchored as a result of the crisis, which erupted in mid-2007. Given their results, we therefore also examine subsamples from before and after mid-2007 to assess the stability of our full-sample results. Finally, in Appendix B we present some regression results using 5-year rolling windows.
News Surprise Data and Controls
Similar to the previous literature, we include surprises on a range of real economy, price and monetary policy-related announcements; (1) the central bank policy rate, (2) headline consumer prices (CPI), (3) industrial production (IP), (4) purchasing managers index (PMI), (5) retail sales, (6) trade balance (defined as exports minus imports), (7) real GDP, and (8) the unemployment rate. We obtained all data releases and survey expectations from Bloomberg 23 and these eight announcements are the ones for which we have data available with a sufficiently long history. 24
For U.S. surprises, we follow others, in particular Gürkaynak et al. (2007a) , by also including: (9) consumer confidence, (10) initial jobless claims, (11) new home sales, (12) and the nonfarm payrolls report.
To measure the size of the surprise involving each data release, we compute the difference between the actual release and the median Bloomberg survey forecast. By including only the surprise component in the regressions, we take out the expected component of the information contained in any news release and which should have already been incorporated in bond yields.
We normalize all surprises by their standard deviation, with the exception of policy rate surprises which are recorded in basis points.
As control variables in our sensitivity analysis, we include daily changes in (1) the VIX, (2) the 12-month WTI futures contract, and (3) the 3-month food futures contract, all of which we obtained from Bloomberg. The VIX serves as a control of overall market volatility, and can also be seen as a control for general investor risk appetite. We include oil and food futures contracts to control for the pass-through of commodity price developments to domestic prices. For example, pass-through from global food shocks tends to be higher in emerging markets compared with developed economies because food is typically a larger component of CPI in emerging markets.
Outlier Analysis
Before we present our main empirical results, we first address the potential impact of outliers in our announcement data. We need to make sure that our results for overall and individualvariable (in)significance will not be driven by just a few influential observations. As the number of announcements per variable will be small given their monthly or even quarterly release calendar, and because only true surprises in the announcements yield non-zero observations, outliers could play a significant role. Therefore, in a preliminary step, we first run simple linear regressions for each country, regressing our left-hand variables in (3) on each individual surprise variable and examine whether any observations qualify as regression outliers. We evaluate individual (x, y) observation pairs based on their leverage through their hat-values, studentized residuals, and Cook's distance. 25 We characterize an observation as an outlier if its Cook's distance is greater than the cut-off ruleof-thumb value 4 N−2 (with N the number of observations in the regression), its hat value is larger than the average hat value of 4 N , and its studentized residual is outside its 95% confidence interval of ±2.
We present the results of our outlier analysis graphically in Figures 8 -10 . In total, we identified four observations per country as outliers in the regressions for far-forward inflation compensation. show regression results using as dependent variables the 1-day changes in: the 1-year nominal rate (column 3), the 1-year forward nominal rate ending in 7 or 10 years depending on the country (column 4) and the breakdown of this into the 1-year forward real rate (column 5) and our main variable of interest, the 1-year far-forward inflation compensation rate (column 6). All reported coefficients should be interpreted as the response (in basis points) to a one-standard deviation surprise in the data release of the corresponding macrovariable (with the exception of the policy rate coefficient which is the response in basis points to a one basis point rate surprise). We use regular OLS standard errors to assess the significance of individual surprise variables (using HAC-style standard errors resulted in very similar results). We highlight surprises that enter the regression significantly; with *** indicating significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Student t-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath each regression coefficient. The results for the joint significance test of news surprises are reported in the bottom two rows of each table.
The first observation to make from Tables 1 through 3 is that short-term interest rates, as represented by the 1-year nominal rate in the third column, respond significantly to sometimes an array of different surprises, but in particular to surprises in the policy rate, consumer prices, industrial production and GDP growth. This is not surprising, given how strongly correlated short- The R 2 s confirm that news surprises explain changes in 1-year rates quite well, which is corroborated by the results of the Wald-test, which for each country strongly rejects the null hypothesis that news surprises do not significantly affect short-term interest rates.
In contrast, the final column in each table shows that the R 2 s in the regressions for far-forward inflation compensation are low. Furthermore, surprises do not significantly affect far-forward inflation compensation for Brazil and Mexico according to the joint Wald test, as its null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the standard 5% level. However, we find that inflation compensation does react significantly to some individual surprises, in particular to IP for Brazil (at the 5% level) and Mexico (at the 10% level), with a two standard-deviation surprise raising inflation compensation by about ten and three basis points in these countries. IP is the only variable (for Mexico also CPI) in the inflation-compensation regressions for Brazil and Mexico that comes in significant, indicating that long-term inflation compensation in these countries does not systematically react to macro news surprises and that inflation expectations therefore appear to be well anchored.
For Chile on the other hand, we find that the null of the Wald test is rejected for the full data sample, which is driven by the strong significance of CPI surprises in the regression. However, the R 2 remains low and it takes a four standard-deviation, 1 percent, unexpected increase in Chilean inflation to increase inflation compensation by 16 basis points. Furthermore, the coefficients of all other surprises are either not significant, or weakly significant at best (GDP and trade).
We checked the robustness of our baseline results by examining a serious of alternative specifications. The results of this sensitivity analysis are discussed in Appendix A and show that our results are indeed robust.
Including Foreign Surprises
We now examine full-sample results when we also include in the baseline regressions U.S. news surprises, in Table 4 , and Chinese news surprises, in Table 5 . Here we only report results for the 1-year nominal rate and 1-year far-forward inflation compensation. The top part of each table shows the coefficients on domestic surprises, while the bottom part shows the regression coefficients and their significance on U.S. and Chinese news surprises, respectively. In the regressions for the daily changes in 1-year nominal rates, domestic surprises that were significant before remain significant with the similar sign and magnitude of coefficients. The bottom half of the table shows that with the exception of U.S. trade for Chile, none of the U.S. surprises come in significantly. For Mexico, at least, this result seems surprising because important macroeconomic data, in particular IP and GDP, are released with a considerable delay. As shown in Table 6 , several U.S. macro figures are released before the first domestic news release in Mexico (similarly for Brazil and Chile). Therefore, because of the substantial lag with which domestic macro news is released, and because of the strong economic linkages between Mexico and the U.S., one would expect that at least some of the U.S. news surprises would have an impact on short-term rates. However, we do not find evidence of this.
As judged by the third column in the table for each country, far-forward inflation compensation does appear to react significantly to a few U.S. news releases. On the one hand, this could indicate that even if the local central banks are able to make long-term inflation expectations resilient to domestic news surprises, they have trouble overcoming the effects of U.S. news surprises on domestic inflation expectations. On the other hand, however, some of these results could also just represent statistical noise. For example, the coefficient on U.S. CPI surprises is negative and significant in the regression for both Chile and Mexico, implying that positive inflation surprises in the U.S.
would lower inflation compensation in these countries, which is not an obvious relationship. One result that does seem worth examining further is how stable over time the positive and significant coefficient of U.S. nonfarm payrolls is for Chile and Mexico (although not significant, its coefficient is also positive for Brazil). We do so in Appendix B using rolling regressions.
The results for Chinese news surprises in Table 5 show that only Brazilian inflation compensation is affected by some data releases in China. This seems in line with the fact that there is very little trade between Mexico and China, while the trade share with China is more important for Brazil. 28 According to the regression results, a three-standard deviation surprise in Chinese IP (equivalent to a surprise increase of four percentage points) leads to a 15 basis point increase in Brazilian inflation compensation, which does not seem unreasonable. On the other hand, however, the coefficient on Chinese GDP surprises in the regression for Brazil has the opposite sign, again alluding to statistical noise. For Chile, whose trade share with China is comparable, we do not find evidence of any impact of Chinese news surprises.
Subsample Results
(Pre-)Crisis Period
To address the potentially destabilizing effects of the financial crisis, we re-estimate our baseline regressions by splitting up the sample in a pre-crisis sample (using data up until July 2007) and a crisis period (using data from July 2007 onwards). Results are shown in Tables 7 -9 with pre-crisis results in the first three columns and results since July 2007 in the last three columns.
The pre-crisis results for Brazil in Table 7 show that the joint test rejects, driven by (weakly) significant coefficients on the policy rate and the unemployment rate, suggesting that prior to the financial crisis, inflation expectations in Brazil were not well anchored. However, the pre-crisis sample for Brazil only consists of just one calendar year of data, with just over sixty observations on surprises overall, and even fewer per individual variable. For example, the significant, but unexpectedly positive, coefficient for policy rate surprises in the third column is due to a single 
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored whether long-term inflation expectations have become better anchored in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, all having adopted inflation-targeting frameworks as their monetary policy strategy over a decade ago to put an end to high inflation. We examined how close inflation expectations have been to the announced inflation targets through an informal and formal analysis, using survey-based as well financial-market-based measures of inflation expectations.
We find that survey-based measures of medium-and long-term inflation expectations in all three countries have been close to or at the inflation target, despite differences among the three with respect to the ways that the central banks communicate their commitment to low inflation.
Measures of far-forward inflation compensation derived from Chilean sovereign bond prices suggest that for the most part investors have been confident that the Central Bank of Chile will bring inflation back to the target. For Brazil and Mexico, far-forward inflation compensation has tended to exceed the inflation target by 1 to 1 1 2 percentage points in most recent years, suggesting that investors have demanded extra compensation to allow for the risk that the inflation target will not be met in either country. For Brazil, the inflation risk premium might reflect some uncertainty about the long-term inflation target, which would be consistent with the upward drift in the surveybased measure of inflation expectations. These inflation risk premia are remarkably small, however, considering both Brazil's and Mexico's more recent inflationary record.
Our regression analysis shows that inflation compensation has been sensitive to the surprises of at least one domestic macro variable in each country, and to some U.S. and Chinese new surprises.
However, the impact of these surprises is small and it does not appear that investors systematically alter their expectations for inflation as a result of surprises in monetary policy, consumer prices, or real activity variables. Overall, our results show that Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have done a remarkable job in convincing investors that their inflation targets are credible and that inflation can be contained. 
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Notes:
The table shows results in columns three to six of regressing Brazilian short-term and 1-year far-forward rates on several domestic macro news surprises for the full sample period July 2006 -April 2013, including only those days on which at least one Brazilian macroeconomic figure is released. The surprises in the policy rate are recorded in basis points, while all other macroeconomic surprises are normalized by their standard deviation. The first column shows the number of included observations per individual news surprise. The second column in the table shows the magnitude of a one-standard deviation surprise, expressed in the unit of each surprise; percentage terms for each variable, except for PMI which is in points, and trade balance which is in millions of dollars. Besides the surprise variables shown, also included in the regressions are a constant and a dummy that takes on the value of one on the first business day of the year and zero on all other days. Student-t statistics are presented between parentheses, while *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The Wald statistic and accompanying p-value are for testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients (with the exception of the constant and the yearly dummy) are equal to zero. 
